Where district court thought that it was compelled by statute to impose same term of supervised release at revocation hearing that was mandated for original conviction, plain error was committed and remand was necessary.
The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a decision by Judge Staci M. Yandle Southern District of Illinois.
In 2013, Allen Teague pled guilty to two counts of distribution of cocaine. The court sentenced him to 78 months of imprisonment, followed by 72 months of supervised release. Teague’s term of supervised release began in May 2018. In 2007, Lonnie Whipple pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine and one count of distribution of methamphetamine. The court sentenced Whipple to concurrent terms of 240 months’ imprisonment on the first count and 141 months’ imprisonment on the second count, to be followed by statutorily mandated concurrent terms of supervised release of 120 months and 72 months respectively. Whipple’s supervised release began in November 2015. In both Teague and Whipple’s cases, the term of supervised release was in part defined by statute.
Both Teague and Whipple ultimately violated the terms of their supervised release, and the U.S. Probation Office moved to revoke each man’s release. The petition against Teague alleged that he had committed aggravated battery on his pregnant wife, received a speeding ticket, failed to meet monthly financial obligations and failed to submit monthly reports to his probation officer. The petition against Whipple alleged that he failed to meet reporting requirements, began using methamphetamine again, committed various driving infractions and fled from the police.
Teague was sentenced to a new term of 36 months’ imprisonment and Whipple to a new term of 30 months’ imprisonment. At both revocation hearings, the district court stated that it believed that, in order to comply with the statutes, it was required to impose the statutorily mandated terms of supervised release from the original counts of conviction onto the sentences imposed at revocation. After being sentenced, both Teague and Whipple appealed, and the appellate court consolidated their appeals.
The appellate panel began by noting that the government conceded that both Teague and Whipple had met all four elements of the plain error test. The panel stated that the statute that governs supervised release, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(h), specifies that when a term of supervised release is revoked, a sentencing court may choose to impose a new term of supervised release to follow the revocation sentence, as long as the new term of supervised release does not exceed the term of release authorized by statute for the offense of conviction, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation.
The panel stated that this provision was unambiguous, and that it was within the court’s discretion to determine whether further terms of supervised release were warranted. The panel cited United States v. Richardson, noting that under some circumstances, such as with incorrigible offenders, the district court may choose to impose as much additional time in prison as possible, and decline to impose new terms of supervised release as a waste of resources. The panel determined that the district court erred in both Teague and Whipple’s cases when it stated that it was compelled by law to follow the statutory minimum for supervised release that applied to the original sentencing proceedings. The panel determined that remand was necessary for the district court to revisit the issue of supervised release. It therefore reversed the decision of the district court.
United States v. Allen Teague; United States v. Lonnie Whipple
Nos. 20-3132 & 20-3132
Writing for the court: Judge Diane P. Wood
Concurring: Judges Amy J. St. Eve and Thomas L. Kirsch II
Released: Aug. 10, 2021